A. Introduction
The Federal Republic of Germany is a state that shows a strong support for culture of any kind. While it is not explicitly stated anywhere in the Grundgesetz (Basic Law), it can be argued that very few nations regard the promotion of the arts, sciences and education as a public undertaking to the extent that Germany does. The federal structure of the German constitution is reflected in the allocation of governmental tasks between the federal government and the individual federal states, or Länder. Under this structure, the Länder bear the primary responsibility for cultural matters 1 . However, contrary to widely-held belief, the Basic Law also grants the federal government a range of legislative, administrative and financial powers with respect to cultural matters. Although when taken together these do not add up to a comprehensive promotional authority of the federal government in the cultural sector, due to numerous individual empowerments, the federal government is without doubt in a position to take an active role in cultural affairs to a significant extent.
In view of the sweeping powers which the Länder enjoy in culturally related matters in comparison to the federal government, it is no surprise that the concept of the Kulturhoheit der Länder (cultural sovereignty of the Länder) has become a common feature in case law and scholarly literature 2 . Institutionally, this cultural 2 See BVerfGE 37, 314, 322; Geis, Die "Kulturhoheit der Länder", DIE ÖFFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG (DÖV) 522 (1992); Hense, Bundeskulturpolitik als verfassungs-und verwaltungsrechtliches Problem, DVBL. 376, 379 (2000) . Cultural Policy Powers in Germany for establishing and expanding all-day schools provided to the Länder by the Federal Ministry for Education and Research 9 also amply illustrate that constitutional law as it applies to cultural matters is undergoing a period of fundamental change.
This article seeks to determine where the constitutional limits of a federal cultural policy lie. To this end, the federal powers in the areas of the arts, sciences and education under current constitutional law will first be investigated in detail. This will be followed by an examination of the financial support for establishing and expanding all-day schools -presently one of the federal government's most important culture policy priorities -with respect to its constitutionality. Finally, the last section of this article examines whether the powers of the federal government with respect to cultural policy have been enhanced as a consequence of reunification. In this context, new doctrinal approaches that argue in favor of an increased importance of the Federation in the cultural sector will also be highlighted.
B. The Constitutional Basis of a Federal Cultural Policy
As a federally constituted nation, the Federal Republic of Germany comprises two tiers of government: the federal government and the Länder 10 . According to Article 30 Basic Law, the exercise of state powers and the discharge of state functions is a matter for the Länder, except as provided for or permitted by the Basic Law. This presumption of authority in favor of the Länder is formulated more specifically with respect to legislation in Article 70 Basic Law, to administration in Article 83 Basic Law and finances in Article 104a Basic Law 11 . However, exceptions to the fundamental principle articulated in Article 30 Basic Law are scattered throughout the Basic law; many of them have implications for cultural policy. 9 24 , during the imperial era, which was accorded continuing applicability and validity as federal law in accordance with Articles 123, 124 Basic Law.
Concurrent legislative power of the Federation
Numerous additional cultural policy powers of the federal government are contained in the catalog of Article 74 Basic Law, which enumerates the matters subject to concurrent legislative powers. For example, according to Article 74 I No. 6 Basic Law, the federal government is responsible for matters concerning refugees and expellees. This also includes preserving the cultural heritage of this group. The prevailing consensus holds that the federal legislature also has the power to issue legal provisions respecting the establishment of memorials 25 . This is derived from Article 74 I No. 10a Basic Law, which assigns to the federal government the responsibility for war graves and the graves of other victims of despotism. Moreover, Article 74 I No. 11 Basic Law is potentially a source of legislative powers for the federal government in the cultural sector. This is because power to legislate economic law also implies the authority to promote film, publishing and translation ( According to the legal definition articulated in Article 72 I Basic Law, the Länder have the power to issue concurrent legislation as long as and to the extent that the federal government has not exercised its legislative power by enacting a law. A federal law that regulates a matter falling under concurrent legislative power has a limiting effect on comparable laws of the individual Länder in both a chronological ("as long as") and an objective ("to the extent that") sense 30 . In view of these constitutional provisions, the relative powers granted in Article 74, 74a Basic Law would appear to give the federal government significant scope to become active in the area of cultural policy. However, this is not entirely the case. It must be noted that the Basic Law makes the exercise of the powers set forth in Article 74, 74a Basic Law dependent on specific prerequisites.
Thus, according to Article 72 II Basic Law, the federal government is only empowered to enact laws in the area of concurrent legislation "if and to the extent that the establishment of equal living conditions throughout the federal territory or the maintenance of legal or economic unity renders federal regulation necessary in the national interest". As originally formulated, Article 72 II Basic Law required only the desirability of a federal regulation. However, this "desirability clause" proved inadequate to limit the legislative power of the federal government. According to the Federal Constitutional Court, the question as to whether the desirability of a national legislative regulation exists presumed a political evaluation on the part of the federal legislature that had to be respected by the judiciary. The desirability clause thus became a vehicle for the erosion of the powers of the Länder, and concurrent legislation became almost entirely a federal matter 31 . The revision of Article 72 Basic Law in 1994 replaced the desirability clause with a "requirement clause". This was undertaken with the declared aim of restricting the scope for political judgment on the part of the federal legislature recognized by the Federal Constitutional Court 32 . In addition, Article 93 I No. 2a Basic Law empowered the Länder to apply to the Federal Constitutional Court should the federal government seek to unduly curtail their legislative powers through an impermissibly broad interpretation of Article 72 II Basic Law. Consequently, there is no longer a broad scope for legislative judgment with respect to the requirements of Article 72 II Basic Law that is not subject to constitutional review 33 .
Areas of federal framework legislation
In the area of framework legislation as well, federal action in accordance with Article 75 I Basic Law depends on the existence of the prerequisites as defined in Article 72 II Basic Law. Framework powers of the federal government that pertain to culture are by no means rare: under the provisions of Article 75 I No. 1 Basic Law, the federal government may enact laws as a framework for the Länder in regulating the legal relations of persons in the public service of the Länder, municipalities, or other corporate bodies under public law. The relevance of this requirement to education becomes clear when one considers that this group also comprises teachers and persons performing research and instruction in higher education -just as does the aforementioned Article 74a I No. 1 Basic Law. 37 . The federal government and the Länder had reached agreement on eleven issues, and resolution of four others was, according to the committee co-chairmen Edmund Stoiber (Christian Democratic Union) and Franz Müntefering (Social Democratic Party of Germany), within reach 38 . However, the opposing sides were ultimately unable to come to an agreement respecting the distribution of powers between the Federation and the Länder in the area of education. In the negotiations, the Länder laid claim to complete authority for educational policy, while the federal government wanted to retain some core powers, including that of enacting framework legislation respecting higher education. As no consensus was possible on this one issue, no changes were made at all. From the vantage of constitutional law, this is scarcely 34 Article 75 I No. 2 Basic Law also displays a clear relevance to cultural matters. This article empowers the federal government to enact framework legislation regulating the general legal relations of the press. To date, however, the Federation has not fully exercised this power, with its great potential impact on cultural policy. Consequently, press matters are regulated primarily by the press laws of the Länder 39 .
Finally, any discussion of framework legislation must examine Article 75 I No. 6 Basic Law, which reserves to the federal government the power to regulate the protection of German cultural assets against expatriation. A comparable authority was originally contained in Article 74 I No. 5 Basic Law, and empowered the Federation to enact concurrent legislation in this matter. As part of the constitutional reform enacted in 1994 40 , federal authority respecting protection of cultural assets was transferred to the catalog of Article 75 I Basic Law in order to better serve the "fundamental responsibility of the Länder for cultural matters" 41 . This modification of the constitution may be explained by the fact that the legislative powers of the federal government under framework legislation are less extensive than under concurrent legislation. This is clearly reflected in Article 75 II Basic Law, which stipulates that framework regulations may contain provisions that regulate specifics or have direct application only by way of exception. A framework law must allow the legislatures of the Länder substantial scope so that they may enact law on their own responsibility 42 . According to the Federal Constitutional Court, this criterion would not be met by any provision which would restrict the parliaments of the Länder to choosing among specified options or executing federal law as a subordinate instance 43 
Joint tasks
Further culturally relevant powers of the federal government are described in Articles 91a and 91b Basic Law. These regulate the extension and construction of institutions of higher education including university clinics as well as the promotion of research institutions and research projects of supraregional significance. Educational and research institutions that are the product of a cooperation between the Federation and the Länder are, for example, the Deutsche Hochschule für Verwaltungswissenschaften (German Academy for Administrative Sciences) in Speyer and the Deutsche Richterakademie (German Academy of Judges) in Trier. The legislation of general principles (Article 91a II Basic Law), governing the performance of the functions set forth in Article 91a I Basic Law, is similar to framework legislation in that it is addressed to the legislative branch. But unlike the framework legislative power of the federal government, which pertains to the legislatures of the Länder, the legislation of general principles is binding for both the federal and state legislatures. Although the federal legislature may alter a general principle to which it no longer wishes to adhere, this requires not only a corresponding resolution of the Bundestag (Federal Parliament), but the consent of the Bundesrat (Federal Council), as well (compare Article 91b II Basic Law). In this way, the Länder can materially influence the formulation of general principles: if the Federal Council, the constitutional organ of the Federation that represents the interests of the Länder (compare Article 50 Basic Law), withholds its consent to a general principle, this proposal has been rejected entirely. The Parliament cannot then enact this measure, however great the majority -not even unanimously. Finally, it must be noted that, in variance to the principle of the separation of powers of the federal and state governments, the provisions of Articles 91a and b Basic Law regulating joint tasks permit mixed administration 44 .
Article 135 IV Basic Law
A "special competence" 45 of the federal government with cultural implications lies "concealed" in the transitional and concluding provisions of the Basic Law. Under certain circumstances, the federal government can, under Article 135 IV Basic Law, promulgate regulations regarding the assets of Länder that no longer exist. This provision provided the constitutional basis that enabled the Federal Parliament to 44 Krüger, Art. 91a, supra note 10 at margin number 6, and Art. 91b, margin number 6. 45 The Federal Constitutional Court described Article 135 IV Basic Law as a "special competence" that enables the federation to establish administrative authorities directly accountable to the federal government, even if the prerequisites of Article 87 III Basic Law have not been met (see BVerfGE 10, 20, 45; 12, 205, 253 47 . In their decision of 14 July 1959, the justices in Karlsruhe held that Article 135 IV Basic Law also applied to the collections formerly belonging to the state of Prussia. The Court ruled that the federal legislature had the authority to establish a foundation for the cultural heritage of Prussia that is directly accountable to the federal government, and to assign this organization the corresponding administrative authority together with transfer of the cultural assets formerly belonging to Prussia. As the act establishing the Stiftung Preußischer Kulturbesitz (Foundation of Prussian Cultural Heritage) did not require the consent of the Länder stipulated in Article 135 V Basic Law, the legislation did not violate the rights of the Länder to participate in the conception and formulation of federal legislation.
Other (express) administrative powers of the federal government
With respect to the administrative authority of the federal government in the cultural sector, it is not possible to exercise the enumerated powers described above (with the exception of Articles 32, 87 I, 91a and b, 135 IV Basic Law). These have no bearing on the question as to how far the federal government can claim executive powers, but instead define legislative powers. However, a proceeding under Article 87 III Basic Law is conceivable in the cultural sector. This article provides that autonomous federal higher authorities as well as new federal corporations and institutions under public law may be established by a federal law for matters on which the Federation has legislative power (Article 87 III 1 Basic Law). The federal government has exercised the administrative powers accruing to it from Article 87 III 1 Basic Law e.g. in providing for foreign broadcasting through the German Wave 48 
II. Implied legislative and administrative powers of the Federation
In its rulings, the Federal Constitutional Court recognizes implied legislative and administrative powers of the federal government within narrow limits. These comprise Kompetenzen kraft Natur der Sache (powers by virtue of the nature of the matter), Kompetenzen kraft Sachzusammenhangs (powers by virtue of the objective context) and of comparable Annexkompetenzen (corollary powers) 49 .
A power by virtue of the nature of the matter derives from the unwritten legal principle founded in the nature of things, not requiring express acknowledgement in the national constitution, whereby certain areas, which by their very nature represent essential matters of the Federation that are a priori beyond the scope of the specified legislative powers, can be regulated by the Federation and by it alone 50 . This traditional formula, developed by Gerhard Anschütz 51 , is still applied by the Federal Constitutional Court today in arriving at decisions. The Federal Constitutional Court has considered conceding to the federal government legislative authority for the presentation of the Federal Republic abroad by broadcasting means on account of the nature of the matter 52 . On the other hand, the literature rightly points out that such a power of the federal government may be derived from Article 73 No. 1 Basic Law. To this extent, it is thus not necessary to invoke unwritten federal powers 53 .
The Federal Constitutional Court deems a power by virtue of the objective context to exist when "a matter expressly allocated to the Federation cannot reasonably be regulated without at the same time regulating a matter not expressly assigned as well, i.e. when an intrusion (of the Federation) into matters not expressly assigned is an essential prerequisite for regulation of a matter assigned to the Federal legislative power." 54 This power by virtue of the objective context originates from 49 See Zippelius/Würtenberger, supra note 1 at 397; Maurer, supra note 30, at § 10, margin number 27-31; Ehlers, Ungeschriebene Kompetenzen, JURISTISCHE AUSBILDUNG 323 (2000) an existing legislative or administrative power and extends this to associated issues. A corollary power of the federal government, on the other hand, is deemed to exist when the preparatory and executive phases of a matter expressly assigned to the federal government are additionally included within the scope of federal powers 55 . As a rule of thumb, one may say that powers by virtue of the objective context have a "broadening" effect, and corollary powers have a "deepening" effect 56 . For example, as a corollary to the power ("defense") expressly assigned to the federal government in Article 73 No. 1 Basic Law, the Federation has e.g. the right to establish military institutions of higher learning. The federal government exercised this power in 1973 to found the Universities of the Federal Armed Forces in Munich and Hamburg.
C. Prohibition of mixed financing
Article 104a Basic Law, which was added to the constitution as part of the finance reform of 1969 57 , formulates the fundamental principle with respect to the financing powers of the federal and Länder governments: "The Federation and the Länder shall separately finance the expenditures resulting from the discharge of their respective responsibilities insofar as this Basic Law does not otherwise provide." Application of this separation principle of Article 104a I Basic Law results in financial powers for the federal government within the context of its administrative powers 58 . This stipulates that the federal and Länder governments will support their expenditures individually, and must finance only their own obligations. This linking of spending power and functional power is also termed the "connectivity principle" 59 . From this follows the general prohibition of mixed financing 60 . 55 Maurer, supra note 30 at § 10, margin number 29. It is not clear wherein the legal significance of this agreement lies. One could initially assert that this agreement codified financial responsibility of the federal government that was not expressly specified in the Basic Law but which according to the constitution belonged to the financial authority of the federal government. But as previously explained, the finance authority is linked to functional authority. Thus, according to the majority view in the academic literature, financial powers of the federal government that do not derive from a corresponding administrative authority can no longer be recognized since Article 104a Basic Law took effect 64 . The purpose of the Consolidation Agreement however could be to enumerate the administrative powers of the federal government that are not explicitly named in the Basic Law. If the federal government held an administrative power in any of the areas mentioned, it would also hold the financing authority 65 . However, the problem then is that in the past, the federal government often provided only cofinancing for the functions named in the Consolidation Agreement. As the unwritten powers referred to in the Consolidation Agreement are always exclusive powers, according to constitutional principles the federal government actually ought to have assumed the complete financing 66 .
D. Federal Funding for All-day Schools -an Unconstitutional Form of Mixed Financing?
With its investment program Zukunft Bildung und Betreuung (Education and Child Care Future), the federal government is providing the Länder with funding to establish and expand all-day schools on a broad, nation-wide scale. The Federation sees its authority to grant financial assistance as deriving from Art 104a IV Basic Law. However, the most recent literature is increasingly challenging the proposition that the federal government is justified in supporting the Länder in promoting all-day schooling 67 .
As the Basic Law grants the federal government no authority to regulate school systems, legislation and administration in this sector are the exclusive preserve of the Länder 68 . Consequently, Article 104a I Basic Law cannot be cited to justify a financing authority of the federal government for school development. However, the second clause of Article 104a I Basic Law makes clear that the Basic Law provides for a deviation from the principle of separate financing of expenditures. Such exceptions are provided for by, among others, Article 104a IV Basic Law, which the federal government cites in the promotion of all-day schools.
Under Article 104a IV 1 Basic Law, the federal government can grant the Länder financial assistance for especially important investments of Länder and municipalities (associations of municipalities) where such investments are necessary to avert a disturbance of the overall economic equilibrium, to equalize differing economic capacities within the federal territory, or to promote economic growth. Further details, particularly the types of investments to be funded, are regulated by federal law that requires the consent of the Federal Council or by executive agreements under the Federal Budget Law, cf. Article 104a I 2 Basic Law. In compliance with this provision, the federal government and the Länder concluded an executive agreement respecting execution of the investment program Education and Child Care Future on 12 May 2003 69 . However, the federal government is also obligated to fulfill the criteria of Article 104a IV 1 Basic Law in promoting all-day schools. The participation of the federal government in financing all-day schools therefore has to serve at least one of the investment aims enumerated in Article 104a IV 1 Basic Law.
The first of these three alternative grounds of Article 104a IV 1 Basic Law obviously fails as a constitutional justification for the financial involvement of the federal government in establishing and expanding all-day schools: Even if one could describe Germany's current economic situation as "a disturbance of the overall economic equilibrium", there are no indications that promoting all-day schools might in any way ameliorate such a disturbance. That the establishment and expansion of all-day schools does not serve to avert a disturbance in the economic equilibrium within the meaning of Article 104a IV Basic Law is underscored by the limitation of this investment program to a period of five years. This limitation fails to take into account economic developments in any form whatever 70 . Cultural Policy Powers in Germany
The question then arises as to whether the federal government may undertake these expenditures on the grounds of the second variant of Article 104a IV 1 Basic Law ("equalization of differing economic capacities"). According to the executive agreement concluded between the federal government and the Länder, the financial assistance is to be distributed among the Länder in proportion to the number of pupils, and thus according to a criterion that ignores the economic capabilities of the respective Länder entirely 71 . As all Länder benefit from federal funding, it is at least conceivable that the federal investment program intended to promote all-day schools could further reinforce existing inequalities between the Länder. Thus, it cannot be assumed that the federal government is seeking to equalize differing economic capacities within the federal territory by means of this investment program. Accordingly, the second variant of Article 104a I 1 Basic Law does not provide a legal basis for the financial assistance provided by the federal government to the Länder for the purpose of achieving and expanding the availability of all-day schools.
At best, therefore, the investment program Education and Child Care Future may be justified by the third variant of Article 104a I 1 Basic Law. The prerequisite here is the necessity of the measure for promoting economic growth. The third variant of Article 104a IV 1 Basic Law does not cover investment programs that focus primarily on education policy, as in this sector funds are not invested in tangible assets intended to bring a future return. As businesses that establish operations in the Federal Republic profit from the quality of the German education system in selecting their work force, however, the federal government might, under certain circumstances, be considered to create the prerequisites for economic growth through its financial commitment to all-day schools. The changes in the production, organizational and decision-making structures in the private sector have undeniably changed the requirements for a great number of occupations. Employees today must be able to plan and organize their work independently, understand complex and networked systems and to think outside the "box" of their individual job description. This requires higher qualifications and presents enormous challenges for the educational system. Education has thus become a decisive competitive advantage for the nation's economy as a whole.
However, an undertaking so uncertain and so chronologically indeterminate in its contribution toward the future qualifications of the employed population as the investment program "Education and Child Care Future" ultimately fails to meet the requirements of the third variant of Article 104a IV 1 Basic Law. It must be considered that the federal investment program benefits schools in general. In other words, the funding is not restricted to facilities and instruction for imparting knowledge specifically to enhance occupational qualifications. If federal financial assistance for schools is permissible at all, the aim of promoting economic growth must be emphasized more strongly in the design of the investment program 72 .
This conclusion is confirmed when one considers that the material prerequisites of Article 104a IV 1 variant 3 Basic Law are formulated in an extremely broad manner. There is thus the danger that prematurely resorting to this provision will deprive the remaining objectives enumerated in Article 104a IV 1 Basic Law of any independent meaning. This must be counteracted through a restrictive application of this provision.
E. Conclusion: Constitutional Limits to an Expansion of Federal Authority in Cultural Affairs
The constitutional problems posed by the funding for all-day schools are not an exception. Reservations have also been expressed respecting other forms of federal intervention in the promotion of culture. These include support for child care facilities, financial assistance for equipping vocational schools, funds for an "Action Program against Right-Wing Extremism, Xenophobia and Anti-Semitism" and support for cultural facilities and events in the Land of Berlin 73 .
Advocates for the cultural ambitions of the federal government often argue that German reunification has resulted in a greater need for a federal culture policy. According to this view, meeting the need for a sufficient representation of the Federal Republic of Germany requires a generous interpretation of unwritten legislative and administrative authority 74 . However, in view of the manifold powers that the federal government can exercise in the cultural sector, this argument is not convincing. Unwritten authority may be exercised only with care, as otherwise the federal system that the Basic Law mandates would be turned on its head. As discussed above, representation of the Federal Republic abroad, including cultural matters, lies within the authority of the Federation. It is not apparent that the nature of foreign cultural policy has changed as a result of German reunification. Whether or not reunification has resulted in a greater need for raising the profile of the federal government domestically is immaterial: domestic 72 Stettner, supra note 9 at 322-323; Winterhoff, supra note 9 at 62-64. 73 Siekmann, supra note 60 at 629 (2002). 74 Nida-Rümelin, supra note 62.
representation on the part of the state may be realized through a cautious extension of unwritten authority, without the necessity of the federal government interfering in spending areas reserved to the Länder. In the past, the federal government has exercised unwritten powers primarily with the argument of the supra-regional nature of particular measures. The Federal Constitutional Court was initially opposed to this line of argument 75 . In particular, the Court cited the ability of the Länder to coordinate their efforts in the form of conferences of ministers and state treaties. Ultimately, however, the Federal Constitutional Court sided with the federal government 76 . Scholarly literature has repeatedly -and rightly -warned of the dangers that such governmental practice pose to the federal structure. Extreme care is to be exercised in every expansion of the unwritten powers of the federal government, not least because Article 79 III Basic Law elevates the federal structure to the immutable core of the German constitutional order 77 .
Neither does Article 35 of the Treaty of Unification, which is often cited in this context 78 , justify a comprehensive cultural policy on the part of the federal government. Article 35 I of the Treaty of Unification contains an affirmation of the Federal Republic of Germany as a cultural nation. Under Article 35 IV, co-financing from the federal government is not prohibited in certain exceptional cases respecting cultural facilities in the acceding territory, particularly in the Land Berlin, that were previously centrally administered. Additionally, Article 35 VII of the Treaty of Unification empowers the federal government to provide financing for individual cultural activities and facilities for a transitional period to promote the cultural infrastructure, with the aim of compensating for the effects of the division of Germany. Under the provisions of Article 45 II of the Treaty of Unification, this treaty acquired the status of federal law on accession of the new Länder to the Federal Republic. However, the Treaty of Unification may not contravene the provisions of the Basic Law, except where it entails amendments of the Basic Law (cf. Article 4 of Treaty of Unification). As Article 35 of the Treaty of Unification was never adopted as an amendment to the Basic Law, it cannot represent a written exception to the principle of separate financing; at best, a constitutionally permissible unwritten authority may be cited. Consequently, no federal authority contra constitutionem can be derived from the cultural nature of the German state affirmed in Article 35 of the Treaty of Unification. It is thus only logical that Article 35 III of the Treaty of Unification expressly refers to the authority of the Basic 75 BVerfGE 12, 204, 252. 76 BVerfGE 22, 217,218.; Stettner, supra note 7 at 325-326. 77 Geis, supra note 2 at 528. 78 Mahrenholz, supra note 1 at 865.
